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WRONGFUL DISHONOR 
By Professor James J. White 
I. Basic Liability 
Section 4-402 renders the payer bank liable for wrongful 
dishonor in the following words: 
§ 4-402. Bank ' s  Liability to Customer for Wrongful 
Dishonor 
A payer bank is liable to its customer for 
damages proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor 
of an item. When the dishonor occurs through mis­
take liability is limited to actual damages.proved. 
If so proximately caused and proved damages may 
include damages for an arrest or prosecution of 
the customer or other consequential damages. Whether 
any consequential damages are proximately caused 
by the wrongful dishonor is a question of fact to 
be determined in each case. 
Typically claims arise under 4-402 when the bank dis­
honors a check of its customer because it (1) has improperly 
set off money in the account� (2) failed properly to credit 
a ·deposit� (3) has made some other error and has so either 
reduced the apparent amount in the account or has mistakenly 
concluded that there are insufficient funds in the account to 
meet· the check. Note below that the dishonor of -a customer's 
check is not the only way that a bank can violate section 
4-402. 
Under the statute and the cases the bank need not be 
guilty of negligence to commit a "wrongful" dishonor. 
Indeed, some courts have found a knowing refusal to pay a 
check (because an account had been reduced in a good faith 
response to a garnishment, for example) more reprehensible 
than mistaken refusal to honor. In short there is prirna facie 
liability under 4-402 anytime a bank dishonors a check under 
circumstances in which there were sufficient funds in the 
account or would have been sufficient funds in the account 
if the bank had made all the correct debits, credits and com­
putations. The fact that the bank's action in reducing the 
account or not crediting it proves only by hindsight to be 
"not correct, 11 is no defense for the bank. Put another way, 
the presence of the adjective 1 wrongful 11 has not enabled payers 
to escape liability by showing good faith and use of reason­
able commercial practices. 
II. Damages 
A. "Actual and Consequential 1  Damages 
The second sentence of 4-402 limits recovery to "actual 
damages proved" when dishonor occurs 11through mistake." The 
inference in that sentence is that there are some damages that 
may be recovered which are not "actual" damages. The next 
sentence authorizes the recovery of "consequential damages." 
Presumably actual damages include consequential damages and 
the only difference between consequential and other forms of 
actual damages would be the length of the chain of causation 
between the dishonor and the damage. 
Courts interpreting the section have granted recovery 
for lost profits, Skov v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 407 F.2d 
1318 (3d Cir. 1969), for mental anguish and for a va.riety :· 
of other somewhat intangible injuries. One case, Bank of 
Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. App. 196 8) 
denied recovery for mental anguish ("nerves" the court called 
it) on the following grounds: "From the proximate cause 
standpoint, these nebulous items of damage bore no reason-
able relationship to the dishonor of her two checks and con­
sequently they cannot be classified as 'actual damages proved.1 1  
Whether one labels the qu�stion as one concerning the 
definition of "actual damage," of "proximate cause" or of the 
word "consequential," it is clear that there is a dispute in 
the courts about the extent to which a plaintiff may recover 
for intangible nonmonetary injuries; of course there is 
· 
always a question about the form of evidence necessary to prove 
proximate causation even for monetary injuries. Consider 
Allison v. First National Bank In Albuquerque, 12 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 885 (N.M. App. 1973, reversed on other grounds 13 
UCC Rep. Serv. 291). In that case the plaintiff had deposited 
in a Mexican bank cashier's checks drawn by the defendant bank. 
The drawer-drawee dishonored the checks when they were pre­
sented and was found to have violated 4-402. In its remand 
to the trial court the court of appeals addressed the conse­
quential damage question as follows: 
As a consequence of the dishonor (1) An 
attachment lien was filed against 54 items of 
personalty of the plaintiff in Mexico seizing all 
his personal assets for purposes of satisfying his 
debts owed to the Mexican bank. (2) Plaintiff was 
personally threatened with imprisonment if the checks 
were invalid. (3) His credit standing was ruined. 
(4) He was placed under a cloud of suspicion in 
his Mexican community. Plaintiff had an excellent 
professional reputation. 
11 Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable and tem­
perate damages determined by the sound discretion 
and dispassionate judgment of the trial court • • •  
12 UCC Rep. Serv. at 891. 
II 
It is apparent that the appellate court was willing to let 
the lower court or the jury place some monetary value on the 
personal threats that the plaintiff received on the loss of 
his credit standing and on the consequences of the "cloud 
of'suspicion. 11 
B. The Trader Rule 
Under the pre-Code law of many states a businessman whose 
checks were dishonored was presumed to have suffered loss be­
cause of injury to his reputation. He could recover for such 
loss even though he could prove no actual monetary loss as a 
consequence of the injury to his reputation. Whether 4-402 
has completely rejected the trader rule is not clear� even 
if the rule has been rejected, the consequence of such a 
rejection is not clear. 
Comment 3 to 4-402 specifically states that the trader 
rule is rejected. Despite that statement in the comments, one 
can argue 4-402 continues the trader rule. One can draw an . 
inference from the second sentence in 4-402 that when the dis­
honor occurs not "through mistake" but through some intentional 
act of the bank (as for example preferring itself in an improper 
set off over the customer) , the liability is not limited to 
"actual damages" as it is in cases in which the dishonor occurs 
only by mistake. Indeed this distinction between mistaken 
and intentional dishonor was followed in the pre-Code New 
York law and the law of some other states prior to the Code. 
At least one case, American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Flick, 146 Ind. App. 122, 252 N.E.2d 839 (Ind. App. 1969) , 
has found that the trader rule continues notwithstanding the 
enactment of 4-402. Nevertheless that court awarded only 
nominal damages to the plaintiff. 
If the trader rule no longer exists, what are the conse­
quences? If one accepts the proposition that intangible 
injury such as "mental distress" is part. of 11actual damages" 
as that term is used in the Code and if he further rejects the 
proposition that 4-402 is fundamentally a contract action 
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governed by Hadley v. Baxendale, it is difficult to see that 
the abolition of the trader rule has had any effect. Pre­
sumably even under the trader rule the jury would have to 
guess about ��e amount of damages it wished to award to 
pL� i:..tiff. Under the generous interpretation of 4-402 
illustrated by the New Mexican court, the jury's job will 
simply be to guess about the "actual damages" that attended 
the mental distress. I fail to see the practical significance 
of the difference between that jury guess and the guess it would 
make under the. trader rule. 
C. Punitive Damages 
A recent Texas case, Northshore Bank v. Palmer, 17 
UCC Rep. Serv. 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 197 5) will send shivers 
down the spines of bank lawyers. In that case the court 
affirmed an award of $2,000 actual damages and $3, 500 of 
punitive damages. In part the court found that the bank had 
not made timely objections to jury instructions of the court 
below. Nevertheless the court found that there was sufficient 
evidence in the record to support a finding of $2,000 actual 
damagesi it did so despite the fact that the out-of-pocket 
loss was apparently only $290. The court held that 4-402 
did not bar the punitive damage recovery and apparently con­
cluded punitive damages could be recovered outside of 4-402 
since the dishonor was "intentional�" The court describes 
the facts of the case as follows: 
"A forger had secured a number of printed 
checks of one Marvel Fikes and proceeded to include 
Palmer as one of his victims. A person showed up 
at the Bank seeking to cash the $27 5 check payable 
to Palmer. The teller ascertained that Palmer had 
an account with the Bank and paid out the money. 
She could not testify as to whether this person 
was or was not Palmer. Some four or five days 
later, the check was returned by the bank on which 
it was drawn because the signature was not like 
the signature of Fikes which it had on file. The 
checks written by Palmer, which are in question 
here, had already been paid by the Bank, when the 
situation with respect to the forgery became known 
to it. The officer in charge irmnediately charged 
Palmer's account with the forged check despite his 
protestations that his endorsement.was a forgery. 
When he went to see the Bank officer to deny 
endorsement and receipt of the proceeds of the 
forged check, the officer called over a uniformed 
guard. Even though the checks had been cleared for 
payment and were covered by sufficient funds when 
presented, the Bank recalled them and returned them 
marked "paid in error11 or "account closed.11 Palmer 
iimnediately reported the forgery to the police, 
contacted the bank on which the forged Fikes check 
was drawn, and contacted Mr. and Mrs. Fikes. Be 
then underwent the embarrassment of calling on each 
of the payees of the dishonored checks. The Bank 
never relented. They charged appellee $5 for each 
check they considered drawn on "insufficient funds". 
Additionally, after all of the claims of Palmer 
were known to the Bank officer having charge of 
the matter, the Bank placed the claimed balance 
· due in the hands of a collection agency, where it 
rests today. The Bank never has paid Palmer the 
$275 which under the jury's findings is wrongfully 
charged to his account. Under.the Bank's own evi­
dence, each step it took was deliberate and inten­
tional and done with a knowledge of Palmer's claim 
of right. The exemplary damages found by the jury 
are reasonably related to the amount of actual 
damages found and are fully justified under the 
evidence. We overrule appellant's points attacking 
special issue number five and the answer of the 
jury thereto." 17 UCC Rep. Serv. at 491. 
E. Damage SUl!!mary 
The foregoing cases make at least the following facts 
clear. (1) Some, perhaps most, courts will grant recoveries 
in proper cases for nonmonetary damages related to mental 
anguish, humiliation and the like. (2) Although the Code 
does not speak to the question, it appears under the rules of 
civil procedure in most juris�ictions these issues will 
be for the jury. (3) No reported case under 4-402 has applied 
the Badley v. Baxendale foreseeability test to the plaintiff's 
request for consequential damages. (4) The trader rule is 
probably insignificant but it may have survived 4-402's 
enactment. 
III. Miscellaneous Asides 
A. Types of checks to which 4-402 applies. 
In the Albuquerque case the court allowed a recovery 
for wrongful dishonor when the bank refused to pay its own 
cashier's check. Ordinarily one would characterize the 
plaintiff's cause of action in such a case as for breach of 
the drawer 's contract under 3-413. However the court analyzed 
it as a 4-402 case and granted a recovery on that basis. Note 
that the use of 4-402 brings in all of the damage claims dis­
cussed above that would not be heard on a traditional contract 
claim. In a similar case the Maine supreme court allowed a 
recovery in Joler v. Depositors Trust Co. , 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 
515 (Maine 1973) • The later case seems sound� the former is 
more questionable. 
B. Zatal· v. First National City Bank, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 
1098 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) is not strictly a 4-402 case, but 
it is analogous. The court sustained plaintiff's complaint 
against the bank ' s  motion to dismiss for failure - to state a 
cause of action. In that case the plaintiff had deposited an 
$8,50 0 check. The bank erroneously credi ted its account wi th 
only $8 50 and consequently bounced a check on the grounds of 
1 insufficient funds. 1 Had the check been presented and the 
credit been correctly made , the bank still wou ld have bounced 
the check but on the basis that it was 1 1drawn against uncol­
lected funds." By rejecting the bank ' s  motion. that court has 
implicitly found a cause of action not for wrongful dishonor 
but for making an incorrect and perhaps defamatory statemen t 
of the reason for dishonor. 
